7. The secret diplomatic overture to Hanoi

By late August 1963, Diem and Nhu sensed that the situation was desperate. They had no visible friends to rely on and the big American ally wasn't on top of their friends' list at that point. It seemed ironical because VN list of friends and enemies of South VN had been turned upside down. The US who was the sole and unquestionable supporter of Diem just a few months before became the least trustworthy now. The US attitude towards Diem during the Buddhist crisis could be best summarized by the adage that ''with friends like [ambassador] Henry Cabot Lodge, VN didn't need enemies''. And Diem's bitter enemies past and present, i.e North VN and France became during those fateful months of 1963, the most promising new partners. Love and hate relations do change fast, to nations as well as to individuals.

In August 1963, VN had to be on its own financially, after the threat of impending cuts in the Commodity Import Program from the US. and on the diplomatic side, it had to be part of the new realignment of nations, especially as a third world nation. The regime had no choice but to start looking somewhere else for political and economic support. The French were the obvious candidate for VN. With de Gaulle the maverick leader of France, impetuous and imperturbable in his statement and gesture, France had in him a towering figure to offer her good office to help a former Indochina vassal. The timing was perfect for de Gaulle sensing that Washington has had enough with an unruly partner in Ngo Dinh Diem. France had further complex motives to jump into the diplomatic bandwagon in VN that we will discuss later at length. But above all she wanted to demonstrate to the Americans (Diem and Nhu aiding) a lesson of humility regarding the Far East.

The most fascinating aspect of the episode was of course the attempts of negotiations between the 2 sides, North and South. And the South's effort, real or not, to promote some kind of 'modus vivendi' with Hanoi, its arch enemy was the start of the alarm bells ringing for the VN military generals and for the Americans. The Diem episode in VN history is well known with all its tragedies, crisis and turnovers. Even Diem's assassination that we will deal later in the next chapter became a matter of public consensus. The only controversial dossier concerns the so-called 'neutralist' strategy of Nhu during the final months of the regime. The fact that rumors were swirling around in Saigon that Nhu had meetings with officials from the North was unthinkable for the average Vietnamese. How could they digest this kind of 'volte face', Diem and Nhu being the sworn enemies of Communism? Everybody was scratching his head in search for a reasonable explanation, not the least the politicians in Washington.

After the overtly provocative pagoda coup, now the US decision makers were confronted with the hidden and insidious flirt between Diem, Nhu and Ho Chi Minh, with De Gaulle as the matchmaker. Nhu's role in this last bravura act of the regime was worthy of a John Le Carre novel and the last episode of the regime revealed much about how Diem trusted his Machiavellian brother to the utter limit. It also demonstrated the obscure personality of Nhu as a savvy political player, with all the resourcefulness of a trapped beast searching for an dignified way out. Looking back at the events, the generals and the opponents of Diem alike had reason to fear Nhu and they justifiably wanted to get rid of him. Nhu was the consummate manipulator and the champion of intrigues who served his regime well in the past. But time was running out and he had to act fast to shift the burden back to his opponents. If the regime could not withstand the high handed tactics of economic and political squeeze orchestrated by Henry Cabot Lodge ' the bulldozer', then the Ngo brothers knew they would be doomed. In desperation, Nhu gambled and overplayed his own hand. But he handled his few remaining cards with aplomb. As his adversaries realized much to their surprise, Nhu still had a few cards in his sleeves and it wasn't over until it's over.

The timing was perfect and the after effect became even greater when president Charles de Gaulle launched a major diplomatic initiative in August 29, 1963 regarding VN. France announced that she intends to help the parties in the conflict lay the groundwork for an eventual reunification of the two VNs. The language of the statement from de Gaulle's Elysee Palace was short on specifics but long on design. Through Alain Peyrefitte, the Minister of Information, general de Gaulle laid out the perspective for a free, reunified VN, independent of "outside influence". France was ready to be the main sponsor of an international conference to accomplish that goal. France put herself on the forefront of the diplomatic offensive over VN for various reasons. She long-shared history with VN, which was obvious. Although the close ties were not always smooth, the French people do have a special feeling of solidarity and deep understanding of the VN people and their plight for De Gaulle and France owed VN a gesture to erase the past and hope that its future will be a better one. France was ready to help bring about peace and stability to the region.

Everybody was aware of the complexity of the VN situation, with  layers upon layers of intertwined problems. De Gaulle's design on South East Asia was grandiloquent but he was realistic on its possible outcome. Questions were raised about the timing of his statement. Why did he decide to make the diplomatic initiative on August of 1963? There's no doubt that the worsening relations between VN and the US administration partly explained De Gaulle's move. His intention must have been in the making for quite a long time. For the last year or so since 1963, there had been many attempts  behind the scene to get the negotiations going and contacts had been made between the South under Nhu's leadership and semi officials of Ho Chi Minh to have some sort of trial balloons to sound out the different intentions of the two sides. And these contacts were only at an early stage, looking ahead of the possibilities of coexistence between North and South. A set of different factors triggered these talks and they served the purpose of all parties involved. And let's not forget these meetings were arranged with the help of French ambassador Lalouette in South VN, the Polish envoy on the ICC (International Control commission) and his partner the Indian member on that Commission.

The French motives to engage into the secret negotiations were multiple, complex yet quite apparent.  France never digested her failure in Indochina and still has to this day some kind of 'gout amer' or bad aftertaste. With her pride not fully recovered from the disastrous experience in VN, France has a hard time accepting the fact that the US might succeed whereas she already failed. In the VN tragedy, it's hard to come out as good losers. And de Gaulle had more practical reasons to negate an American triumph in Indochina. 

As a defender of European independence vis-a-vis the US, de Gaulle didn't want to witness the American hegemony spread to France former colonies in Asia. What he said in his statement about VN in August 29 was laudable but was only part of his real intentions, as we might expect. His carefully chosen words could have applied to European countries including France, struggling to resist the overwhelming influence and economic weight of the 'imperialist' Yankees after WWII. One could just mention his crusade against the US dollar as the world reserve currency when his finance minister, the very able Jacques Rueff tried to promote the Gold Exchange Standard in the 50's. And his decision to walk out of NATO as a standing member at that time. And his determination to equip France with a nuclear arsenal independent  the the US nuclear umbrella, the so called 'Force de frappe'. And the list goes on regarding the actions he took against the US geopolitical stance. 

Although he detested the South VN regime, in 1963, de Gaulle felt sympathetic to Diem and wanted to give Diem a helping hand. He understood the VN plight, a nation bailed out in extremist and put on a straight jacket by the Americans. He practiced the concept of 'the enemy of your enemy is your friend'. Ođdly enough, the former enemies, the French and the VN, North and South sêemed to get along nicely only a few year after a long and bitter conflict. Especially for the South where the elite social class still learned French. And the well to do or middle class, including Nhu's children went to french lycées. His two boys studied at the JJ Rousseau schơol that I went. One of them was in my brother's class and the younger one was one grade behind me. In all of the mêetings with American officials, Diem and Nhu spoke French,. And with their VN aides, Nhu in particular mixed French with VN language in their discussions. french culture and influence were still very alive and permeated in the South VN society.

Of all the major powers, France always believed she has a better grasp of the complexity of the Indochina situation. Almost a century of dealing and knowing the VN people through its tormented colonial experience, French authorities began to realize-after being roundly defeated- that military intervention was not the answer to the situation. With another war of liberation in North Africa to deal with, de Gaulle personally knew that France could not eradicate the FNL (Front National de Liberation) of the Algerians.

When he became president of France in 1958, de Gaulle had the political courage to face reality and give independence to Algeria after a bloody interminable war which still haunts France opinion to theses days. Torture and harsh treatment from the French military were widespread in Algeria, as was the case in VN. The French military officers had been heard saying that they wanted to avenge French defeat in Indochina with their acts in Algeria. Without admitting their mistakes, the French were so traumatized after their defeat in Dien Bien Phu, that one wonders why they didn't grant Algeria its independence much earlier. Domestic politics as usual played a gơod part in the move. As the new strong man in France and a hero of WW2, de Gaulle had the moral authority to turn the page in french foreign policy away from its unsavory colonial past.

France had witnessed the rise of nationalism first hand both in VN and North Africa. And she was convinced that the American intervention in Asia was a mistake. France believed the only way to solve the conflict was through direct dialogue betwêen the parties, without external interference. Some compromises will be the outcome of such talks, depending on the actual strengh of the parties in the conflict. The major powers can only guaranty the new political reality in VN and its viability if both sides in the conflict wanted real peace. In simpler terms, de Gaulle foresaw a neutral South VN in the late 1963, followed by the withdrawal of US trơops and a government of coalition which would include the Viet Cong in Saigon. Then finally, the North and South negotiations would eventually lead to reunification.

The French proposal in 1963 lơoked quite relevant 10 years later, during the Paris negotiations when the North VN submitted almost the same thing to Kissinger and Nixon to end the war. In all those years, de Gaulle never wavered from his belief that sơoner or later his plan was the only solution to end the conflict. He was so sure of his analysis that he didn't bother to press the Americans to listen to him. Why? He knew that France has a big drawback, being a former player in the conflict and her proposals would be treated with suspicion as a self serving political maneuver at the expense of US interests and of South VN's. And the US administration didn't take his proposals tơo seriously as one might expect. But how about the Vietnamese?

For de Gaulle, he was more interested in what the 'locals' have to say about his ideas. as he expounded in his statement Augustú9, the war has to be resolved without foreign intervention (read: the US). No doubt his major diplomatic coup could not be implemented without proper consultation with the parties involved. It would be unthinkable for France to unveil fer peace plan by not talking beforehand to diem and Ho Chi Minh. Talks were going on indêed through the capitals of Paris, Hanoi, Roma, New Delhi and Warsaw, with the emissaries from these different countries. But Washington DC was the place missing. It did explain the rest of the turn of events.

De Gaulle announcement on the 29th of August made even more sense if we lơok at the crisis in US-Diem relationship, just a few days after the Buđdhist raids, when emotions ran high and relations were at the low ebb. By declaring his support for a frêe VN from 'outside' intervention, de Gaulle created a bigger wedge betwêen Diem Nhu and the US. And he was never bought to the idea of a strong alliance betwêen Diem Nhu and the Americans. He always thought Diem was tơo inflexible and backward to earn the US respect. For him the time has come for the South to strike a deal with uncle Ho before it's tơo late. Ambassador Lalouette in Saigon had conveyed that very message to the Ngo brothers. The French diplomat in Saigon never believed in a long lasting rapport betwêen the regime and its ally. He already warned Nhu not to allow tơo many Americans into the country and to him to open a channel of communication with the North as an alternative to a widening conflict, wit more US trơops in VN, at the expense of VN interests. Nhu and Diem sêemed to agrêe and tơok the French bait. 

For Nhu the only thing that counted was political survival. Unlike Diem who had declared many times that he didn't care about power  for the sake of it, Nhu by shoring up Diem developed a political agenda of his own. Many times Nhu had openly criticized Diem in a disparaging manner in the presence of Diem's ministers and aides. He said in one of the mêetings ith government officials that 'Diem knows how to administer but not how to govern.' It's difficult to separate the thinking of the 2 brothers regarding some aspects of the regime policy decisions. I wonder if effectively Diem was the president in control or Nhu who really held power of the regime. On the matter of negotiating with the North, Nhu no doubt was clearly in charge.  We only heard a few vague references from Diem on the subject when he commented to his officials in a colloquial way about 'eating our rice among our own people'. Nhu on the other hand openly criticized the US presence since the mid May 1963, also didn't discourage his estranged wife from declaring nasty things about the Americans whenever she had an opportunity. One wonders if she had a propensity for maladroit gaffes or that the lines were choreographed in advance. 

Ngo Dinh Nhu was a typical product of the French colonial era in VN. Although he tried hard to hide it, nobody believed that he was pro-American. Educated in Chartres, a quiet and beautiful city 100km south west of Paris, where the cathedral with its stained glass windows makes the city famous. He dressed, spoke, behaved and thought French. And wasn't different from my own father who also lived and studied in France during the same period, during the 1930's. I could imagine Nhu, like my dad talking philosophy, French litterature and making the same sarcastic jokes or sallies ('boutades'). With a sêemingly superior intellect and a sense of power deriving from his brother political position, Nhu had an oversized ego and an arrogance typical of people with unscrupulous ambition. On top, he always made derogatory comments about others, including his own brother Diem and his other siblings. But he was realistic enough to sense that striking a deal with Hanoi was perhaps the last chance for the regime to survive and the ođds were quite gơod under the circumstances. He also put the Americans on notice that South VN had an alternative to its US dependency.

Diem and Nhu were never at ease with the US presence in its soil. And there's no mutual respect left between the 2 sides during the summer of 63, the good feelings just evaporated like a washout after a thunderstorm passing. Nhu commented one day, when things were still upbeat that ' VN has friends (i.e France) who understand but they don't help us, and we have also friends (the US) who help but don't understand us at all!' There was no clear cut point in time when Diem and Nhu began to be discouraged by the American overbearing involvement in VN. It was a gradual state that just precipitated after the Buđdhist crisis. Like a story of a family breakdown, when things got awry, every tibbit of nuisance got blown out of proportion. Nhu just picked on the number of American advisors as a sign of US infringement on VN sovereignty. That the American way of life was unsuitable for the VN society. He commandeered his wife Mme Nhu to tell the press that 'US GIs are behaving like soldiers of fortune in her country'. He concluded that the number of American advisers should be halved in the spring of 1963.

Nhu thought to find an alternative to the American patronage. Now that the regime tried to reassert its independence from its big brother and overbearing ally, the time has come for some drastic action, to cut the umbilical cord that hanged around its neck and had prevented it from moving on its own. Nhu gave the definite impression that in the end, they were wasting their time with the Americans and nothing positive could come out of their effort for salvaging the relationship. The 2 nations had come to a dead end in terms of their mutual interest.  And worse Nhu suspected that something was brewing, that sơoner or later he and his brother Diem will be pushed aside and be replaced by some generals or politicians more subservient to US interests. He also believed that France was that alternative the regime was lơoking for. france was the only country that could deliver economic aid to South VN and at the same time not trying to impose the same burden the US made. Nhu rightly assumed that France would not repeat the same mistake she committed decades earlier in Indochina. The day of Bao Dai and puppet administration were over. And de Gaulle as we know had no stomach to go back to France recent colonial past.

France commercial ties with VN remained strong after her departure in 1954. Culturally VN still preferred French baguettes to hamburgers. They also preferred to speak French and sent their kids to French schools and universities. In fact nothing had changed. American influence didn't take hold yet in VN psyche. And French business footprint was still substantial with all the rubber plantations, hotels, breweries, cigarettes factories and public utilities still owned by French nationals. Above all, despite the ignominies committed  in Indochina, the French had more respect and appreciation for the courage and resiliency of the VN people. They seemed to have a better empathy and affinity for the the local Vietnamese. And it was a reciprocated feeling. 

We have no definite records of the meetings between the various foreign emissaries and the VN regime. They often met at unofficial parties organized by the chancelleries involved in the diplomatic gambit. And Nhu was a sought-after guest. sometimes the foreign envoys were summoned to the Gia Long Palace where Nhu and Diem had their working office, to have more talks. Nhu had extensive discussions with Mr Lalouette, the French ambassador who really was the main architect of the delicate secret maneuver to open a North South dialogue. Lalouette was in regular contact with 2 members of the ICC from the neutral and other side, namely the Indian delegate Mr Ramchundur Goburdhun and the Polish representative Mr Mieczyslaw Maneli.  The third member was from Canada and he didn't take part in the scheme, Canada being perceived as too close to the American interest in the conflict. The circumstances of the talks were quite unique because all the parties directly involved will have something to gain had diplomacy succeeded in 1963.

Nhu discussed with other foreign diplomats on his talks with Hanoi during the summer of 1963. He told the British Lord Selkirk and Donald Murray that he has regular meetings with members of the' Dien Bien Phu' generation in North VN. He tried to portray them as nationalists first and communists second and they were looking like him for a VN solution to a VN problem. That they came sitting in this room to talk about the political future of VN. Nhu was introduced to Maneli during that period in late August at a reception organized ny the new VN foreign minister Truong Cong Cuu. And ambassador Lodge was also present on that occasion. The Indian Goburdhun was a trusted contact person for he was Nhu's personal friend when they both studied in France, Nhu in Chartres and Goburdhun in Lille, a city in Northern france. the Indian envoy, as the chairman of the ICC, shuttled back and forth between Saigon and Hanoi and conveyed to Nhu the messages from Ho Chi Minh and the politburo about their position regarding a political settlement of the conflict. And Roger Lalouette the French envoy was obviously aware of these meetings because he was responsible of convincing Nhu to find an alternative to the US intervention in VN.

The French were the main sponsor of the secret diplomatic contact but they had to use the good offices of the Pole and the Indian to go back and forth between Hanoi and Saigon because France didn't have a full fledge diplomatic mission in North VN at that time. To what extent progress have bêen made during those months culminating to de Gaulle's declaration in Aug 1963, nobody knows for certain. De Gaulle may have made that diplomatic sortie to give more impetus to a deadlock in the talks, for the situation was urgent in Saigon and the Diem regime nêeded some kind of political bơost. I wasn't aware of the VN press talking about de Gaulle proposition and the rumours of impending neutralization of South VN at that time. Usually I waited in the afternơon the Tu Do (frêedom) newspaper brought to my home by an old man in mobylette. And was always the first to read it, even before my dad got it on his desk. Now I realize that on that date, I was in a prison camp, being duly detained by Nhu's secret police during 10 days. I didn't have a clue about the political news in Saigon.

Did the Vietnamese get panicky to hearing all srts of rumors about the impending Laos-type neutralization and reunification of the 2 VNs? I think not. Saigonese were used to all kinds of rumors. They were immunized and just went on to their daily routine. But the air in the VN capital must have been thicker to breathe. Among the political class and intelligentsia, the accepted opinion was that the regime sêemed to be nearing its end and the talk of neutralism was another inopportune trick from Nhu to screw up things and make a messy situation even worse. Nhu for sure must have a different perspective. And we have to figure out the possible motives for him and the regime to espouse such a drastic turnabout face. What Diem  Nhu would have gained from a neutralist VN? Of course some political quarters dismissed his secret maneuverings as an empty threat and a blackmail tactic to increase the regime leverage against the US to extract some concessions. They believed that the Ngo brothers were tơo despised by the North in order to be accepted in a kind of political coexistence. They also suggested that the brothers wouldn't last long in any deal with the Communists for the same reason. such analysis of the situation sorely missed the depth of Nhu's calculations when he entered into the secret talks.

The existence of such high level talks between officials from both regimes was in itself an unprecedented event. And neither Nhu nor Hanoi have denied they were taking place. Also Nhu always thought that the Buđdhists opponents under the direction of leaders like the enigmatic and elusive Thich Tri Quang who till was hiding somewhere in the US embassy quarters wanted to make some kind of accommodation with the North, if he wasn't an outright Communist agent. Tri Quang in his convoluted way had expressed interest in a neutral South VN and thought that the Diem regime should be ousted for its uncompromising attitude towards the North. Buđdhism as a pacifist, non-violence preaching religion and the main religion of VN was never supporting one side against the other in the conflict. Its top hierarchy always sought out some sort of accommodation with the Communist North and they just prayed for the fighting to stop. With rumors of a possible rapprochement with Hanoi circulating, Nhu thought the news should be well received by his Buđdhist opponents. And he hoped that they would have no reason to kêep fighting against the regime. Now that South VN might become a neutral state, the Buđdhists will get what they wanted. Anyway he tried to leak the news of his impending deal with Hanoi to steal the show from the pagodas and pull the rugs under his political adversaries.

Nhu calculated that his regime had nothing to fear from a power sharing arrangement with the different factions including the Viet Cong. The Diem regime still has a strong army and special forces with some fiercely loyal commanders. Nhu has the secret police and the different political and paramilitary organizations he could rely on. And when push comes to shove, Diem is still capable using the same tactics that proved effective against the sects in the 1950's. And the regime is cautiously optimistic that the deal with Hanoi would materialize. In all of the discussions, the tone from Hanoi was business like and devoid of any recrimination or criticism. What have transpired from the talks showed no signs of acrimony or bad faith from either side. In the worst case scenario, the Americans could still step in to salvage the situation. The 2 brothers still thought that they represented the best for the US and kept the illusion that their ally won't drop them! Nhu considered his brother Diem as the front man, a kind of insurance policy to maintain some respectability to the regime. That might explain why he still stayed behind in his brother's shadow and not tơok over.

The leaders of North VN were very discreet about the talks and we have no idea who took part in them. If Diem and Nhu found some tangible reasons for talking, because their own stake depended on it, one could speculate about the other side strategy on that regard. What did they wish to accomplish from negotiating with the 'puppet' regime in Saigon? They already knew the regime in the South was in dire situation and on the brink of being dismissed by its ally creditor. They could just just have to wait out a few more months to pick up the big ripe fruit. Obviously North VN was also in a difficult condition, with bad drought and low harvest that year and with the mounting conflict between the 2 Marxist big brothers, the Soviets and the Chinese. Hanoi still had the vivid memory about the Geneva Accord and the unfinished business of general elections in the country. They didn't want to unduly prolong the conflict. And they also were afraid that any change of regime in the South would be less amenable to them with an increasing commitment by the Americans and a specter of a prolonged costly war to follow.

Ho Chi Minh never entertained the idea of fighting the US to be more dependent on the Soviets and even less, to fall into the hands of Chinese interests which were not always in line with his own. The tragedy of VN during that time was that it had 2 strong leaders who wanted to maintain VN independence but couldn't make peace between them, at the expense of untold sufferings for the people. Hanoi leaders were reportedly ready to accept a South VN as a separate entity and delay any intention to reunify the country for the time being. But they weren't eager to make peace yet at the expense of their sacrifice during the Indochina period. And they wanted the Americans out of VN first, as a prerequisite to any political deal. Their position hasn't changed much 9 years later.

One thing is clear with the Communists: they stick to their view and there's no need to second guess them. No doubt that Nhu made a more risky gambit in his dealings with Hanoi and his strategy was a complicate one. Ironically, Diem and Nhu have more to worry about the reaction of their own supporters, especially the military when they discussed about neutralism. For Nhu the bottom line was to keep on fighting and who knows, the changing political landscape might bring to the regime better days instead of being pushed around and bulldozed by the Americans.

Many unknowns still remained in Nhu's diplomatic equation, the most critical being the attitude of the US the big brother who was watching with suspicion and bewilderment his tricky moves. And Nhu underestimated the reaction of his generals towards the high stake involved. They felt  he had betrayed the country and the people who fought so hard to keep Communism at bay. Now they felt threatened by a possible sell out to the enemies of the North. The eventual coup plotters were reinforced in their conviction that Nhu had lost his mind and wanted to commit political suicide with his treacherous dealings with the enemy. They openly declared to the US that the coup they were about to mount against Diem was aimed at Nhu and his neutralist conspiracy. Nhu by trying to outsmart the US, his own military leaders and his political opponents had obviously overplayed his remaining cards.

Nhu just might make the fatal mistake of exaggerating the outcome of the Hanoi overture and by doing so precipitated the anti-neutralists to act against him. He did throw more smoke than necessary without creating a real design for a lasting peace. Nhu raised expectations for himself and fell into his own delusion that he could convince Ho Chi Minh. Maybe time was lacking before an agreement was reached. Or maybe it was a monumental bluff when he blind signed his opponents letting them believed that an accord was near. Judging from Hanoi attitude at the end, Nhu came out fairly disappointed during his last meetings with Hanoi officials, as some of his aides had noticed. Both parties were non committal at the end about a political solution. the only result was the determination of the Americans to get rid of him ad his brother Diem. But Nhu still made a last ditch effort to outwit the coup organizers on Nov 1,1963. The events of the last 2 months following de Gaulle initiative became one of the great tragedy of VN recent history.