9. The death of Diem and Nhu

The generals decided on November 1st as the date to launch the attack on Diem although they still had some normal business to attend to. Tran Van Don has told his American CIA contact, colonel Lucien Conein to keep ambassador Lodge in town, so not to arouse any suspicion from Diem Nhu. They even received that day admiral Harry Felt the Pacific Fleet chief during a courtesy visit in Saigon. Don attended the meeting in the Presidential Palace that morning. He wanted to keep Diem in Saigon to effectively launch the coup. During their conversation, Diem did raise the question of an attempted coup and talked in an unusually direct manner to Lodge. 

The president seemed to know about the impending army revolt but was unable to give names. Maybe he was keeping some hope that both he and Nhu would prevail or convince Lodge and the US to change their mind. Before Lodge and Felt departed, Diem suddenly unleashed the most important phrases.  Diem said to Lodge that 'I would rather be frank and settle questions now than talk it about after we have lost everything. Tell president Kennedy that I take all his suggestions very seriously and wish to carry them out but it is a question of timing.' Some Diem supporters later insisted that Diem had really accepted the US offer to make peace with the Buddhists and ask Nhu to leave. It was another proof of his goodwill and real intention to improve. Or was it another trick for Diem to buy some more time? In any case Lodge couldn't change the turn of event. The coup was a few hours away and it was too late for Diem. He shouldn't wait until the last minute to back down.

At 1:30 pm, while the participating generals and officers were gathering at the Army HQ for a luncheon meeting, the key areas in Saigon were occupied like the airport, police headquarters, central Post Office. A few hours later Diem Nhu realized that their counter coup had failed. General Dinh already switched side and abandoned them to their fate. Colonel Tung the Special Forces commander was brought to the Army HQ and forced to tell Diem that he had surrendered. He was executed right after. Navy captain Ho Tan Quyen a Diem loyalist and commander of the VN navy was also shot by his officer in the very early hours of the coup. The insurgent troops were preparing for the assault against the main objective, the presidential guard units who were defending Diem at Gia Long Palace.

At 3:00pm, Diem phoned to the rebel HQ and talked to Don about reforms and a new government. Don told him it was too late and Diem had to surrender unconditionally and he promised safe conduct for the 2 brothers and their families. Minh repeated the same message as other generals did one after another. When Nhu phoned later he got the same answer.

At 4:00pm, Khiem reached the Palace and warned Diem that it was encircled by military units ready to attack. Don ordered 2 fighter planes to bomb the garrison defending Diem. They launched rockets and received heavy triple As in return.

At 4:30 pm, Diem phoned ambassador Lodge and the conversation was reported many times over. Essentially Diem wanted to sound out about the US attitude towards the coup organizers. Lodge did his best to give a straight answer. He changed the subject and offered the two brothers safe conducts to leave VN. Lodge seemed to worry about Diem and Nhu safety. Diem didn't bother to react to Lodge suggestion.

At 4:45pm, Tung before his execution, was ordered to tell Diem that the situation was hopeless and al resistance would be futile. General Minh warned that if the 2 brother didn't surrender, the Palace would be bombed in 5 minutes. Diem Nhu were unfazed by Minh's threat. But other reports indicated that Diem was ready to resign after these critical conversations with the generals. But he was prevented by Nhu who believed rightly or wrongly that they would be liquidated by the rebels if they surrendered.

Exploiting the confusion that reigned during the early hours of the siege, Diem Nhu walked away from he Gia Long Palace and entered a small car with the Republican Youth director Cao Xuan Vy and drove to Cho Lon, at the residence of Ma Tuyen, a republican youth loyalist of Chinese descent. They spent the night there. Diem frantically worked the phone until dawn the next day to look out for support from general Huynh Van Cao, the 4th Corps commander and other units around Saigon. But the loyal troops were cordoned off from Saigon by the rebels.

Nhu suggested to his brother to go their separate ways. Diem towards the Mekong Delta of general Cao and he would go north to the II Corps of general  Nguyen Khanh. Nhu logic was that if one of the two will be arrested, the coup leaders would not dare eliminating him for fear of reprisal from the remaining escaped brother. But Diem didn't want to separate from Nhu. It must have been tense and touching moments for until the end Diem still tried to protect his younger brother. Diem said to Nhu: 'if they catch you, they will kill you on the spot because they hate you. You stay with me, I will protect you. We've been through a lot since the last many years. We better stick together'.

Around 5:00am on November 2nd, Diem Nhu went to church not far from their hiding place to have confession and they attended mass for the last time.  At about 7:00am, captain Do Tho a Diem aide in the escape group phoned to his uncle Do Mau, a plotter to arrange for president Diem to be picked up by a military convoy. Minh hurriedly ordered general Mai Huu Xuan and colonel Lam, the Military Police chief to prepare for the two brothers to be transferred to the coup HQ, from Cho Lon. They used a M113  amphibious vehicle to transport Diem Nhu back to saigon. When the convoy arrived at the church, Nhu angrily protested that '...the transport vehicle was unfit for a president, and we are not prisoners'. Diem thought that he could go back to the Gia Long Palace before meeting the rebel leaders at the Army HQ. Xuan responded that there is no possibility to go back to the Palace for 'security reason'. It was the same answer he used when I was detained on August 25th!  After some haggling the two were forcibly shoved into the M113 , in an undignified way. And their fate was sealed in that armored vehicle.

During that time general Minh conferred with a few of the plotters about Diem's future. Many versions were told about what happened next. The most credible account was that Minh already gave the secret order to his aide captain Nhung to kill the two brothers before they went out to receive them in Cho Lon. Some other sources told a different story, that Minh was too undecided to make such a  critically important decision alone, without a vote from each and every one of the coup leaders. With his weak character, Minh must have preferred to share the burden of the murder of Diem Nhu with them. While the meeting took place to decide  about Diem Nhu's fate the convoy was doing big circles in the streets of Saigon awaiting a verdict from the deliberation.

According to the second version, the coup organizers decided by a vote of 10 out of 12 in favor of death for Diem Nhu. But the mystery just thickened. Many of them were curiously missing during the fateful vote, like the sophisticated Tran Van Don, his mild-mannered Le Van Kim, Nguyen Khanh the last minute coup member and also absent was Nguyen Van Thieu, the 5th division army commander which was given the mission to attack the Presidential Palace. Thieu becoming president 4 years later vehemently denounced Minh for killing Diem. It looked like Minh had set up a kangaroo court , with all his backers around him to decide beforehand that Diem Nhu must be eliminated and presented the more reluctant plotters with a fait accompli. In the end all the fingers pointed to big Minh as the man who ordered Diem's murder. But we will never know who really gave the order to kill, for the coup organizers had sworn not to tell the truth, so to avoid individual responsibility. By doing so they had the smart idea to be blamed collectively in the eyes of history! It was a callous act unworthy of Minh and the rest of the junta and it didn't bode well for the military regime replacing Diem.

When the convoy arrived at the JGS HQ and they opened the vehicle back hatch the two brothers were already dead. It was a gruesome execution that we don't need going into details. Some of the generals were genuinely shocked by the bloody murder of the two brothers. Others much less so. When Don asked Minh on the spot about the circumstances of their killings, Minh shot back: 'it's none of your business! They are dead...' But intelligent coup leaders like Don realized that it was a tragic blunder that might already explained the failure of the new military government. With the continuous wrangling and suspicion, its existence will be short lived. Nobody seemed to be happy about the swift success of the coup, except the ordinary people on the streets of Saigon. Looking back at the pictures of the coup leaders, who were part of the Revolutionary Military Council, during press conferences and official appearances, they all expressed grim and grieving faces, as if they just attended some sort of funeral. Now the new leaders had a lot of damage control to work on and some explaining to do. And a lot of internal bickering about who's to blame for Diem's death.

Washington still didn't know about the brothers' murder and president Kennedy gave a direct order to find them. The message was relayed to the CIA contact Lucien Conein. He headed back to the JGS HQ and talked to Minh and inquired about Diem Nhu fate.
'They committed suicide' says Minh. 'Somehow they escaped from the Palace to Cho Lon. They were in a Catholic church. And they killed themselves.' 'Look' Conein says. ' You are a Buddhist. I am a Catholic. If a priest holds Mass for them tonight, everybody is going to know that he didn't commit suicide. That story won't hold water.' And it was All Souls' Day when Catholics pray for all who have died without atoning for their sins.

Back in Washington November 2nd, 1963, 9:35 am, the White House Cabinet Room. Kennedy: 'It's hard to believe he'd committed suicide given his strong religious career.' Ngo Dinh Diem 's spiritual career included years in New Jersey seminary, daily Mass and Communion and a commitment to sexual abstinence. Suicide is a mortal sin in Catholic theology, warrant for eternal damnation. Diem's death was not his choice. Roger Hilsman, one of JFK advisors, clings to the suicide story: ' He's a Catholic but an Asian Catholic' Hilsman says. JFK: 'He's what?' Hilsman: ' He's an Asian Catholic. suicide, and not only that, he's a, a mandarin. It seem to me not at all inconsistent with Armageddon'. Hilsman the State expert on Far Eastern affairs trying to explain the Diem enigma!

A few hours later when the news were confirming Diem's murder, the president tried to understand; 'If big Minh ordered the execution, then, then, uh I don't know. Do we think he meant to?'
'There's some suspicion' Hilsman says. 'Some think he did' Bundy says. 'Some think he did' repeats Hilsman. The president says: 'Pretty stupid'. He may refer both to Minh's lack of character by killing Diem and Hilsman's lack of explanation.

I remember vividly the episode when I heard on the radio about the news of Diem's suicide on the afternoon of November 2nd. Then, there was a press conference by Tran Tu Oai, the spokesman for the junta that I remembered listening. He and others tried to spin a few days later to the press that there was a fight (the French word he used was escarmouche) between  Nhu and some officers before boarding the M113. Nhu as general Oai explained, tried to kill himself by seizing the pistol from an officer and accidentally was killed. As for Diem he tried to prevent his brother from the act and during the 'melee' was also shot 'accidentally'. So to summarize it was 2 accidental suicides!

I was still traumatized by my own experience with Diem Nhu a few months earlier to shed tears on their death. But with hindsight I really admit that their assassination was the most shameful act of the military in VN. The murders were horrible enough but the way the new plot leaders tried to justify what really happened was beyond me. First they talked about suicide from a very religious person, Ngo Dinh Diem. I understand that big Minh was a Buddhist and he may be ignorant about religious matters. But how about the rest of the group? There were plenty of Catholics in the military and they should know better. Even a high school kid would know it. Secondly they changed their version and talked about accidental suicide, as they demonstrated in a flimsy way in the press conference. And then people noticed later on the pictures in the New York times that the two brothers had their hands tied behind their back drowned in blood lying inside the armored vehicle. As some commentators said: ' It's pretty difficult to commit suicide with their hands tied from behind!'

There are no sufficient words to describe the abject incompetence of the new military leaders and their abnormal mediocrity while facing the desperate gravity of the country situation. By killing Diem and covering up their intention in an amateurish way, they showed an image of deceit and bloodiness that handcuffed their future actions. Most of them had already doubts about the political legitimacy of their role and the effectiveness of their administration.The people of South VN and their US ally will be very disappointed shortly long after. Nothing came out from their stay in power. During the next 3 months, all they did was picking their nose and waiting for another general to oust them. The chaotic situation in VN had just dragged on for another few years.

8. Anatomy of the November 63 coup

The frustration kept mounting when the US couldn't convince the regime to change its policy during the late summer of 1963. When the various parties suspected that Diem Nhu meant business dealing secretly with Hanoi, the wake up call was rude. Rumors of coup(s) filled the air in Saigon parallel to rumor of neutralism. As has been known, the average Vietnamese didn't see what's the big fuss is all about. The only group not amused was the army generals, a worried lot during that period. For them, their future hung in the balance. All those years of blood and sweat to fight Communism, and now their own political leaders they serve wanted to betray them and shake hand with the reds.

The Saigon army went through a peculiar itinerary. It has served many political masters, first the French during the Indochina War then the anti-Communist Diem propped up by the Americans. It wasn't an easy act for many of the top officers who were torn between their sense of patriotism, free of domination from a colonial power but not subservient to an unpopular and despotic  Diem, in the fight against the totalitarian North. In other words the army like any other group had to choose side during the mid 1940's and 50's. But its decision to support any regime had a tremendous consequence not only for its own survival but also for maintaining stability of the nation.

Unlike the various religious military sects that switched allegiance like changing shirts during the Indochina struggle, the regular army and its top brass were aware of the kind of loyalty they must exercise. You can't fight against the VC one day and be their political ally the next. As a national force, the South VN army or ARVN was the last line of defense and in principle a well disciplined organization to maintain security, law and order, i.e the cohesion of the South. And the military generals supposedly took pride in its professionalism realizing that the people of South VN depended on its steadfastness as well as its political impartiality.

VN generals weren't really trusted by Diem Nhu and the feelings were mutual. The relationship was never been smooth to say the least. Although some of its popular officers like then colonel Duong Van (big) Minh rallied behind Diem to defeat the sects during the first years of the regime, Diem remembered the Nguyen Van Hinh episode. He was almost unseated by the pro Bao Dai air force general at the very start of his tenure. In his nine years as leader of the South, Diem was subjected to countless coups and plots by his military. It was to become for the Ngo brothers a constant reminder that generals and colonels, as any other group must be controlled and bought to dissuade them from being hostile.

It's not hard for any observer to notice that there was no effective way of conducting a war against a formidable enemy while the government and its military leaders were at odds and suspicious of each other. And sometimes the officers took their role too seriously when they in fact conducted themselves as warlords and created their own fiefdom by dismissing orders from the civilian authorities. In a society where democracy was (and is) an alien concept, the military in VN had difficulty knowing the limit of their power. The challenge is more acute when a war was being fought. VN military generals behaved as prima donas when they got involved in politics and they were no different than their civilian counterparts, minus a formal decent education. They fought against the common enemy, against the regime and among themselves. And they didn't do well in all of those fronts.

Diem as usual was perceptive in his analysis of other people weakness. He had misjudged many friends and foes alike, but towards his own [army] generals, the blanket assessment he had was, to say the least, unflattering. And most people, including the Americans had to agree. For that reason Diem was seeking to divide the military brass by pitching  one against another to weaken their effectiveness to harm the regime. He isolated or 'deactivated' some of the generals he thought must be plotting against him instead of fighting the war. Like general 'big' Minh and others from the 'French' school. Again it was a tragic shortcoming that plagued the war effort until the collapse of the South as a viable alternative to Ho Chi Minh.

In hindsight, it's too convenient to blame the military and its lack of character for losing the war. Any different perception wouldn't change the outcome of the conflict. But we weren't there yet during the Diem final days. More had to come later during the generals' period of governance, in the continuing saga of the South until the final defeat in May 1975. And we should not compare South VN military leaders to Israel's both in military prowess and political achievement.

After the pagoda raids, generals Don and Minh openly seek to contact American officials for their support in an eventual coup. The Americans had no choice but to wait for the VN to come forward with a definite plan to oust the Ngo brothers. If Diem has to be replaced, it would better be a VN initiative. And during that time, there was no shortage of coup attempts from the military. Ironically it was Dr Tran Kim Tuyen, the security chief of the regime who laid the groundwork back in 1962 for a successful ouster of Diem Nhu.

From his innermost vantage point in the regime apparatus, Tuyen was well placed to ponder the chance of survival for the regime and he didn't see much hope. He tried to canvass the top generals to prepare a coup in early summer of 1963. He sought out the help of colonel Do Mau, the army security chief, a loyal Diem supporter and general Tran Thien Khiem of the Joint Chiefs. It was a smart move with Do Mau on his side, for all military intelligence to be relayed back to the Presidential Palace would be secured.  Tuyen didn't go far in his effort when Nhu got wind of his swift about face. Tuyen was dismissed and sent to Cairo as a consul in the VN embassy in Egypt. In any case generals Don and Minh never believed in Tuyen as a genuine coup leader against his own boss and they were suspicious of Do Mau as well as of Khiem, an obscure military leader who saved Diem from an earlier coup attempt in November 1960.

General Don the handsome Army chief of staff had no real miltary power at his disposal, the same for general Minh who was in 1963 just a military advisor to Diem, a purely symbolic title in the army. With a few other senior officers from the 'French school' like Le Van Kim, the intellectual related to Don as his in-law, retired and deactivated by Diem and general Tran Van Minh, called little Minh for his small physical stature, the plotters had some brains but not much in terms of military muscle. The main obstacle for a successful coup was the obvious diligence and distrust of Diem Nhu. They still had quite a number of loyal field commanders in all parts of the country. especially the III military corps which comprised the key area of the capital Saigon, under general Ton That Dinh, a favorite of Diem. Adding to the confusion was a long list of generals who sat on the fence, waiting for the tide to shift before committing their troops to either side.

Generals Don and Minh had to be careful not to arouse suspicion from those officers who might just be on the opposite camp. What they needed to do was to convince the 4 corps commanders throughout VN and the various military unit officers, namely the army divisions around Saigon to align themselves with the plot. Sometimes they had to woo, to cajole and played on their ego. General Dinh was one of the key players to be brought in that way. As a young military upstart, he had political ambition to become minister in the Diem cabinet. So Don suggested to him to submit the idea to president Diem, only to be rebuffed. Dinh didn't take the refusal lightly and he joined the anti-Diem group. In any case, Dinh although a Diem shoo-in officer wasn't highly considered by Diem. 

There was an anecdote that showed how Diem regarded his officers. He complained to Nhu one day (without naming Dinh) that although of royal family blood Dinh had no diploma and didn't know how to express himself in public. Other key generals gave some promise of support but no firm commitment, like general Nguyen Khanh the II Corps commander, a favorite of the Americans to succeed Diem, and general Do Cao Tri, the I Corps commander. The situation was very fluid and as a prognostic of the outcome, anything could happen that would change the equilibrium of the forces of both sides.

Washington was very impatient to relay its not so subtle intention favoring a coup to the generals, through its embassy during that summer, especially through Henry Cabot Lodge. The 'Diem must go' school was hardened in its conviction after the Buddhist raids in August 21st. State Department officials sent a momentous cable to the Saigon Embassy directing Lodge to give Diem an ultimatum to make concession to the Buddhist monks and to get rid of Nhu or else...

Much had been debated about that memorandum sent 3 days after the storming of Nhu Special Forces to suppress his opponents. It created quite a storm in the US administration circle immediately after the cable was sent. And more recriminations were voiced years later. The fact must be clear that the anti-Diem officials in the State and the White House like Roger Hilsman, the assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs, Averell Harriman Under secretary of State for Political affairs and a few others like George Ball and Michael Forrestal from the NSC wanted to surreptitiously forward a drastic policy measure to a converted ear, i.e ambassador Lodge without seriously discussing the political impact at the highest level of the US government.

In hindsight I feel amazed by the continuing heated arguments about that small cable sent on the 24th of August 1963. Had the ouster of Diem brought peace and stability to the region, we wouldn't talk about the way it was sent or the fact that it was not officially cleared by President Kennedy. It was a blame 'in retrospect' and Roger Hilsman and the rest were just scapegoats for a failed policy, whether US directives towards Diem were sent in August or September that year, or whether they were properly discussed ad infinitum by the policymakers beforehand or not. But there's no doubt that the green light was given to Lodge to speed up the planning to overthrow Diem in August 1963.

Kennedy and other high officials from his administration supposedly had second thoughts about the instructions contained in the cable. But they didn't seem to backtrack from their position or send another memo to Lodge denying the first memo. When years later the turn of events became sour, the same officials who fast-tracked the policy instructions to Lodge then felt particular misgivings about the decision to depose Diem and Nhu. They admitted that the policy in the cable was a serious blunder that predestined an open-ended engagement of US troops into VN with the result that we know now. It was interpreted as the single most serious flaw in the US decision making process during the entire war.

The cable incident revealed a more troubling fact that the US government was dead lost in its policy orientation vis-a-vis the viability of Diem and his regime. The most serious flaw I think was the lack of decision towards Diem rather than the way it was relayed. US officials were evenly divided over how to deal with Diem, right from the early days of the Kennedy administration. State Dept people adhered to the anti-Diem school. Well known Kennedy men like Harriman, Hilsman and Ball were allergic to Diem Nhu. And they had their point man in Saigon in the person of Henry Cabot Lodge, the US ambassador in VN.

There were no outright Diem backers in the US, except for Nolting who was removed and being replaced by Lodge. The CIA people like William Colby and his director McCone were reluctant Diem supporters. The Defense officials were in between although general Harkins was leaning towards the regime. But these men just asked the basic same question about the alternative to Diem and his regime. Did the generals or the civilian politicians have a better chance to prosecute the war and do a better job?  And who are they? The unfortunate thing was that nobody knows the answer. Being optimistic the Americans had some hope that some generals would come forward as some kind of Bonaparte and save the day for Washington decision-makers.

The Americans curiously had long dropped the idea of a civilian government emerging from a post-Diem era. They adopted the prediction model of a military government to replace Diem in order to aggressively wage the war against the North. The actual generals who volunteered to oust Diem by contacting the US officials didn't give Washington reason to be cheerful. The anti-coup faction in the US had some cause for real concern. Not one of the coup organizers seemed capable of filling Diem's shoes as a viable future leader of South VN. If the State Dept people  were gong ho to replace Diem, the rest of the US administration, the Defense officials, the CIA were pessimistic of a coup, even if it succeeds. In another word, US policy towards VN was in total disarray during late summer of 1963. And time was running out for a solution.

The weekend following the pagodas raids, Roger Hilsman and other State officials secretly drafted instructions to the US embassy in Saigon telling 'VN military commanders of US support in case of a breakdown of the central government'. General big Minh through his contact man general Don wanted assurances from the US not to thwart a coup attempt in the coming weeks. All he wanted was American moral support and the continuation of economic aid from Washington. It was a done deal for the US. Like it or not, the US was part of the plot to oust Diem. It had no other choice but to hope for the coup to succeed. Otherwise the alternative would be to withdraw in humiliation. American officials had gone past the stage of evaluating the personalities of different coup leaders. They had reservations about most of them but they couldn't handpick any of them. The ball was on the generals court now. They had the time and date of their choosing to launch the attack against their own government. 

Confusion reigned for the next few weeks while all the conspirators figured out how to coordinate the different coup factions against the Diem regime. As usual the generals wanted to be the first group to get credit to topple Diem and save the country. The Tuyen-Do Mau faction was still planning to strike first, being the earliest to  prepare for a coup. Now they have an added figure in colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, the chief inspector of the Strategic Hamlet Program, a maverick and highly dubious character who was suspected to have communist ties. If this faction failed in its task to oust Diem, the regime will be alerted to subsequent attempts fomented by other groups, to the detriment of all Diem opponents, according to general Don calculation. His difficulty was to unite and synchronize the myriad conspiracy plans. And dates had to be revised many times. For the Americans, it was just another proof that the generals couldn't make up their mind, and it didn't bode well for the new military junta later on. Ambassador Lodge compared them to 'spaghetti noodles that have to be moved when they curled under pressure'. He told the French envoy Lalouette that if the generals failed to deliver, he would look for the colonels to do the job!

Diem Nhu didn't stay idle during all this. They were plotting their own coup by devising a coded name counter plan called Bravo I. Their own spy network had ample information about the coup plotters and their plans. Moreover secrecy among gossipy generals and their entourage was hard to keep. On July 11th, Nhu even summoned the top generals in the country to warn them about risking their own neck if they try to mount another coup. It was before the pagodas incident. Don And Minh were in a very tenuous situation because leaks got out from all sources and they thought that even the Americans might be double-crossing them! These worries were confirmed when on Sept 1st, the Times of VN the English newspaper of the regime headlined: ' CIA financing planned coup d'etat'. Frankly the generals didn't need that.

The plot and counter plot got thicker like a John Le Carre novel when Nhu intended to lure his opponents into a trap by preempting them with his own coup, Bravo I. He asked his most loyal general, Dinh the commander of the Saigon area to fake a coup, sometime in October, just after the VN's national holiday of the 26th. With deployment of the Special Forces outside of the capital to distract his adversaries, Dinh's troops would occupy Saigon and stage a revolt to attract the real plotters to expose them and force them to react. With goon squads and fake anti-Diem units killings a few Americans and Vietnamese, and liberating a few political prisoners, Diem Nhu after a few days in hiding would come back with Dinh troops to restore calm and order. That should be the second part of the scheme called Bravo II. And Nhu opponents would face another fait accompli situation. Nhu wanted to repeat the same tactics of the pagodas raid and blaming the army once again.

Nhu's problem was that general Dinh and others couldn't keep up with his bizarre plans. These were treacherous moves which seemed attractive on paper but not easy to execute. Even the bombastic and macho airborne commander Dinh felt uneasy about their feasibility. He could hardly accept Nhu, a dilettante political strategist although much feared and respected, now getting involved in military matters. Dinh may not possess Nhu's intellect but he has a big ego too. Although most observers thought Dinh was loyal to the Diem family until the end, things began to change when Dinh noticed that he couldn't bet on a mad and losing side. The plan from Nhu was too fantastic to succeed and even if it did, it would create chaos and civil war in South VN. But still the other plotters didn't trust general Dinh.

Don had another general to worry about, the operation officer of the Joint Chiefs, Tran Thien Khiem, a professional conspirator who was part of the original coup, the Tuyen-Do Mau group. He was the most low key and obscure figure of the November coup although he played a central role due to his function as the operational officer of the Armed Forces. Khiem had the enviable position to be part of all the groups involved in the critical events at the time. He was a trusted Diem supporter who saved the regime back in 1960 during another coup attempt. He stuck his finger with Tuyen for unseating his own boss that he saved and he also got involved with Don and Minh as part of the more 'senior and wiser' generals to oust Diem. That's no small acrobatic feat for someone in VN to wear competing hats in that period. Khiem even became ambassador in Washington under general Khanh tenure, as a sign of disapproval for his role in the plot against Diem. And during Thieu regime, he later was appointed prime minister. And better, he was suspected to be a long time CIA agent.

Finally under Khiem's urging, Don and Minh started to make the ball rolling and put into action the long awaited coup. Khiem had some 'proofs' that Nhu secret talks with the North were serious enough to warrant the decision to get rid of the 2 brothers. Everything was in place, the different factions agreed to coordinate their plans under the leadership of big Minh. The date was set for sometime in November. And the rest of the events did create monumental changes to VN, unfortunately not for the better. At that moment in Saigon, tragedies were about to unfold. Looking back, Vietnamese and Americans surely feel now a sense of loss, of unfinished mission and guilt. Even as a small victim of Diem repression, I feel that the overthrow of Diem and his tragic death was 'the big mistake' among other mistakes of the war. And I will have to try hard to be fair to the coup leaders.

7. The secret diplomatic overture to Hanoi

By late August 1963, Diem and Nhu sensed that the situation was desperate. They had no visible friends to rely on and the big American ally wasn't on top of their friends' list at that point. It seemed ironical because VN list of friends and enemies of South VN had been turned upside down. The US who was the sole and unquestionable supporter of Diem just a few months before became the least trustworthy now. The US attitude towards Diem during the Buddhist crisis could be best summarized by the adage that ''with friends like [ambassador] Henry Cabot Lodge, VN didn't need enemies''. And Diem's bitter enemies past and present, i.e North VN and France became during those fateful months of 1963, the most promising new partners. Love and hate relations do change fast, to nations as well as to individuals.

In August 1963, VN had to be on its own financially, after the threat of impending cuts in the Commodity Import Program from the US. and on the diplomatic side, it had to be part of the new realignment of nations, especially as a third world nation. The regime had no choice but to start looking somewhere else for political and economic support. The French were the obvious candidate for VN. With de Gaulle the maverick leader of France, impetuous and imperturbable in his statement and gesture, France had in him a towering figure to offer her good office to help a former Indochina vassal. The timing was perfect for de Gaulle sensing that Washington has had enough with an unruly partner in Ngo Dinh Diem. France had further complex motives to jump into the diplomatic bandwagon in VN that we will discuss later at length. But above all she wanted to demonstrate to the Americans (Diem and Nhu aiding) a lesson of humility regarding the Far East.

The most fascinating aspect of the episode was of course the attempts of negotiations between the 2 sides, North and South. And the South's effort, real or not, to promote some kind of 'modus vivendi' with Hanoi, its arch enemy was the start of the alarm bells ringing for the VN military generals and for the Americans. The Diem episode in VN history is well known with all its tragedies, crisis and turnovers. Even Diem's assassination that we will deal later in the next chapter became a matter of public consensus. The only controversial dossier concerns the so-called 'neutralist' strategy of Nhu during the final months of the regime. The fact that rumors were swirling around in Saigon that Nhu had meetings with officials from the North was unthinkable for the average Vietnamese. How could they digest this kind of 'volte face', Diem and Nhu being the sworn enemies of Communism? Everybody was scratching his head in search for a reasonable explanation, not the least the politicians in Washington.

After the overtly provocative pagoda coup, now the US decision makers were confronted with the hidden and insidious flirt between Diem, Nhu and Ho Chi Minh, with De Gaulle as the matchmaker. Nhu's role in this last bravura act of the regime was worthy of a John Le Carre novel and the last episode of the regime revealed much about how Diem trusted his Machiavellian brother to the utter limit. It also demonstrated the obscure personality of Nhu as a savvy political player, with all the resourcefulness of a trapped beast searching for an dignified way out. Looking back at the events, the generals and the opponents of Diem alike had reason to fear Nhu and they justifiably wanted to get rid of him. Nhu was the consummate manipulator and the champion of intrigues who served his regime well in the past. But time was running out and he had to act fast to shift the burden back to his opponents. If the regime could not withstand the high handed tactics of economic and political squeeze orchestrated by Henry Cabot Lodge ' the bulldozer', then the Ngo brothers knew they would be doomed. In desperation, Nhu gambled and overplayed his own hand. But he handled his few remaining cards with aplomb. As his adversaries realized much to their surprise, Nhu still had a few cards in his sleeves and it wasn't over until it's over.

The timing was perfect and the after effect became even greater when president Charles de Gaulle launched a major diplomatic initiative in August 29, 1963 regarding VN. France announced that she intends to help the parties in the conflict lay the groundwork for an eventual reunification of the two VNs. The language of the statement from de Gaulle's Elysee Palace was short on specifics but long on design. Through Alain Peyrefitte, the Minister of Information, general de Gaulle laid out the perspective for a free, reunified VN, independent of "outside influence". France was ready to be the main sponsor of an international conference to accomplish that goal. France put herself on the forefront of the diplomatic offensive over VN for various reasons. She long-shared history with VN, which was obvious. Although the close ties were not always smooth, the French people do have a special feeling of solidarity and deep understanding of the VN people and their plight for De Gaulle and France owed VN a gesture to erase the past and hope that its future will be a better one. France was ready to help bring about peace and stability to the region.

Everybody was aware of the complexity of the VN situation, with  layers upon layers of intertwined problems. De Gaulle's design on South East Asia was grandiloquent but he was realistic on its possible outcome. Questions were raised about the timing of his statement. Why did he decide to make the diplomatic initiative on August of 1963? There's no doubt that the worsening relations between VN and the US administration partly explained De Gaulle's move. His intention must have been in the making for quite a long time. For the last year or so since 1963, there had been many attempts  behind the scene to get the negotiations going and contacts had been made between the South under Nhu's leadership and semi officials of Ho Chi Minh to have some sort of trial balloons to sound out the different intentions of the two sides. And these contacts were only at an early stage, looking ahead of the possibilities of coexistence between North and South. A set of different factors triggered these talks and they served the purpose of all parties involved. And let's not forget these meetings were arranged with the help of French ambassador Lalouette in South VN, the Polish envoy on the ICC (International Control commission) and his partner the Indian member on that Commission.

The French motives to engage into the secret negotiations were multiple, complex yet quite apparent.  France never digested her failure in Indochina and still has to this day some kind of 'gout amer' or bad aftertaste. With her pride not fully recovered from the disastrous experience in VN, France has a hard time accepting the fact that the US might succeed whereas she already failed. In the VN tragedy, it's hard to come out as good losers. And de Gaulle had more practical reasons to negate an American triumph in Indochina. 

As a defender of European independence vis-a-vis the US, de Gaulle didn't want to witness the American hegemony spread to France former colonies in Asia. What he said in his statement about VN in August 29 was laudable but was only part of his real intentions, as we might expect. His carefully chosen words could have applied to European countries including France, struggling to resist the overwhelming influence and economic weight of the 'imperialist' Yankees after WWII. One could just mention his crusade against the US dollar as the world reserve currency when his finance minister, the very able Jacques Rueff tried to promote the Gold Exchange Standard in the 50's. And his decision to walk out of NATO as a standing member at that time. And his determination to equip France with a nuclear arsenal independent  the the US nuclear umbrella, the so called 'Force de frappe'. And the list goes on regarding the actions he took against the US geopolitical stance. 

Although he detested the South VN regime, in 1963, de Gaulle felt sympathetic to Diem and wanted to give Diem a helping hand. He understood the VN plight, a nation bailed out in extremist and put on a straight jacket by the Americans. He practiced the concept of 'the enemy of your enemy is your friend'. Ođdly enough, the former enemies, the French and the VN, North and South sêemed to get along nicely only a few year after a long and bitter conflict. Especially for the South where the elite social class still learned French. And the well to do or middle class, including Nhu's children went to french lycées. His two boys studied at the JJ Rousseau schơol that I went. One of them was in my brother's class and the younger one was one grade behind me. In all of the mêetings with American officials, Diem and Nhu spoke French,. And with their VN aides, Nhu in particular mixed French with VN language in their discussions. french culture and influence were still very alive and permeated in the South VN society.

Of all the major powers, France always believed she has a better grasp of the complexity of the Indochina situation. Almost a century of dealing and knowing the VN people through its tormented colonial experience, French authorities began to realize-after being roundly defeated- that military intervention was not the answer to the situation. With another war of liberation in North Africa to deal with, de Gaulle personally knew that France could not eradicate the FNL (Front National de Liberation) of the Algerians.

When he became president of France in 1958, de Gaulle had the political courage to face reality and give independence to Algeria after a bloody interminable war which still haunts France opinion to theses days. Torture and harsh treatment from the French military were widespread in Algeria, as was the case in VN. The French military officers had been heard saying that they wanted to avenge French defeat in Indochina with their acts in Algeria. Without admitting their mistakes, the French were so traumatized after their defeat in Dien Bien Phu, that one wonders why they didn't grant Algeria its independence much earlier. Domestic politics as usual played a gơod part in the move. As the new strong man in France and a hero of WW2, de Gaulle had the moral authority to turn the page in french foreign policy away from its unsavory colonial past.

France had witnessed the rise of nationalism first hand both in VN and North Africa. And she was convinced that the American intervention in Asia was a mistake. France believed the only way to solve the conflict was through direct dialogue betwêen the parties, without external interference. Some compromises will be the outcome of such talks, depending on the actual strengh of the parties in the conflict. The major powers can only guaranty the new political reality in VN and its viability if both sides in the conflict wanted real peace. In simpler terms, de Gaulle foresaw a neutral South VN in the late 1963, followed by the withdrawal of US trơops and a government of coalition which would include the Viet Cong in Saigon. Then finally, the North and South negotiations would eventually lead to reunification.

The French proposal in 1963 lơoked quite relevant 10 years later, during the Paris negotiations when the North VN submitted almost the same thing to Kissinger and Nixon to end the war. In all those years, de Gaulle never wavered from his belief that sơoner or later his plan was the only solution to end the conflict. He was so sure of his analysis that he didn't bother to press the Americans to listen to him. Why? He knew that France has a big drawback, being a former player in the conflict and her proposals would be treated with suspicion as a self serving political maneuver at the expense of US interests and of South VN's. And the US administration didn't take his proposals tơo seriously as one might expect. But how about the Vietnamese?

For de Gaulle, he was more interested in what the 'locals' have to say about his ideas. as he expounded in his statement Augustú9, the war has to be resolved without foreign intervention (read: the US). No doubt his major diplomatic coup could not be implemented without proper consultation with the parties involved. It would be unthinkable for France to unveil fer peace plan by not talking beforehand to diem and Ho Chi Minh. Talks were going on indêed through the capitals of Paris, Hanoi, Roma, New Delhi and Warsaw, with the emissaries from these different countries. But Washington DC was the place missing. It did explain the rest of the turn of events.

De Gaulle announcement on the 29th of August made even more sense if we lơok at the crisis in US-Diem relationship, just a few days after the Buđdhist raids, when emotions ran high and relations were at the low ebb. By declaring his support for a frêe VN from 'outside' intervention, de Gaulle created a bigger wedge betwêen Diem Nhu and the US. And he was never bought to the idea of a strong alliance betwêen Diem Nhu and the Americans. He always thought Diem was tơo inflexible and backward to earn the US respect. For him the time has come for the South to strike a deal with uncle Ho before it's tơo late. Ambassador Lalouette in Saigon had conveyed that very message to the Ngo brothers. The French diplomat in Saigon never believed in a long lasting rapport betwêen the regime and its ally. He already warned Nhu not to allow tơo many Americans into the country and to him to open a channel of communication with the North as an alternative to a widening conflict, wit more US trơops in VN, at the expense of VN interests. Nhu and Diem sêemed to agrêe and tơok the French bait. 

For Nhu the only thing that counted was political survival. Unlike Diem who had declared many times that he didn't care about power  for the sake of it, Nhu by shoring up Diem developed a political agenda of his own. Many times Nhu had openly criticized Diem in a disparaging manner in the presence of Diem's ministers and aides. He said in one of the mêetings ith government officials that 'Diem knows how to administer but not how to govern.' It's difficult to separate the thinking of the 2 brothers regarding some aspects of the regime policy decisions. I wonder if effectively Diem was the president in control or Nhu who really held power of the regime. On the matter of negotiating with the North, Nhu no doubt was clearly in charge.  We only heard a few vague references from Diem on the subject when he commented to his officials in a colloquial way about 'eating our rice among our own people'. Nhu on the other hand openly criticized the US presence since the mid May 1963, also didn't discourage his estranged wife from declaring nasty things about the Americans whenever she had an opportunity. One wonders if she had a propensity for maladroit gaffes or that the lines were choreographed in advance. 

Ngo Dinh Nhu was a typical product of the French colonial era in VN. Although he tried hard to hide it, nobody believed that he was pro-American. Educated in Chartres, a quiet and beautiful city 100km south west of Paris, where the cathedral with its stained glass windows makes the city famous. He dressed, spoke, behaved and thought French. And wasn't different from my own father who also lived and studied in France during the same period, during the 1930's. I could imagine Nhu, like my dad talking philosophy, French litterature and making the same sarcastic jokes or sallies ('boutades'). With a sêemingly superior intellect and a sense of power deriving from his brother political position, Nhu had an oversized ego and an arrogance typical of people with unscrupulous ambition. On top, he always made derogatory comments about others, including his own brother Diem and his other siblings. But he was realistic enough to sense that striking a deal with Hanoi was perhaps the last chance for the regime to survive and the ođds were quite gơod under the circumstances. He also put the Americans on notice that South VN had an alternative to its US dependency.

Diem and Nhu were never at ease with the US presence in its soil. And there's no mutual respect left between the 2 sides during the summer of 63, the good feelings just evaporated like a washout after a thunderstorm passing. Nhu commented one day, when things were still upbeat that ' VN has friends (i.e France) who understand but they don't help us, and we have also friends (the US) who help but don't understand us at all!' There was no clear cut point in time when Diem and Nhu began to be discouraged by the American overbearing involvement in VN. It was a gradual state that just precipitated after the Buđdhist crisis. Like a story of a family breakdown, when things got awry, every tibbit of nuisance got blown out of proportion. Nhu just picked on the number of American advisors as a sign of US infringement on VN sovereignty. That the American way of life was unsuitable for the VN society. He commandeered his wife Mme Nhu to tell the press that 'US GIs are behaving like soldiers of fortune in her country'. He concluded that the number of American advisers should be halved in the spring of 1963.

Nhu thought to find an alternative to the American patronage. Now that the regime tried to reassert its independence from its big brother and overbearing ally, the time has come for some drastic action, to cut the umbilical cord that hanged around its neck and had prevented it from moving on its own. Nhu gave the definite impression that in the end, they were wasting their time with the Americans and nothing positive could come out of their effort for salvaging the relationship. The 2 nations had come to a dead end in terms of their mutual interest.  And worse Nhu suspected that something was brewing, that sơoner or later he and his brother Diem will be pushed aside and be replaced by some generals or politicians more subservient to US interests. He also believed that France was that alternative the regime was lơoking for. france was the only country that could deliver economic aid to South VN and at the same time not trying to impose the same burden the US made. Nhu rightly assumed that France would not repeat the same mistake she committed decades earlier in Indochina. The day of Bao Dai and puppet administration were over. And de Gaulle as we know had no stomach to go back to France recent colonial past.

France commercial ties with VN remained strong after her departure in 1954. Culturally VN still preferred French baguettes to hamburgers. They also preferred to speak French and sent their kids to French schools and universities. In fact nothing had changed. American influence didn't take hold yet in VN psyche. And French business footprint was still substantial with all the rubber plantations, hotels, breweries, cigarettes factories and public utilities still owned by French nationals. Above all, despite the ignominies committed  in Indochina, the French had more respect and appreciation for the courage and resiliency of the VN people. They seemed to have a better empathy and affinity for the the local Vietnamese. And it was a reciprocated feeling. 

We have no definite records of the meetings between the various foreign emissaries and the VN regime. They often met at unofficial parties organized by the chancelleries involved in the diplomatic gambit. And Nhu was a sought-after guest. sometimes the foreign envoys were summoned to the Gia Long Palace where Nhu and Diem had their working office, to have more talks. Nhu had extensive discussions with Mr Lalouette, the French ambassador who really was the main architect of the delicate secret maneuver to open a North South dialogue. Lalouette was in regular contact with 2 members of the ICC from the neutral and other side, namely the Indian delegate Mr Ramchundur Goburdhun and the Polish representative Mr Mieczyslaw Maneli.  The third member was from Canada and he didn't take part in the scheme, Canada being perceived as too close to the American interest in the conflict. The circumstances of the talks were quite unique because all the parties directly involved will have something to gain had diplomacy succeeded in 1963.

Nhu discussed with other foreign diplomats on his talks with Hanoi during the summer of 1963. He told the British Lord Selkirk and Donald Murray that he has regular meetings with members of the' Dien Bien Phu' generation in North VN. He tried to portray them as nationalists first and communists second and they were looking like him for a VN solution to a VN problem. That they came sitting in this room to talk about the political future of VN. Nhu was introduced to Maneli during that period in late August at a reception organized ny the new VN foreign minister Truong Cong Cuu. And ambassador Lodge was also present on that occasion. The Indian Goburdhun was a trusted contact person for he was Nhu's personal friend when they both studied in France, Nhu in Chartres and Goburdhun in Lille, a city in Northern france. the Indian envoy, as the chairman of the ICC, shuttled back and forth between Saigon and Hanoi and conveyed to Nhu the messages from Ho Chi Minh and the politburo about their position regarding a political settlement of the conflict. And Roger Lalouette the French envoy was obviously aware of these meetings because he was responsible of convincing Nhu to find an alternative to the US intervention in VN.

The French were the main sponsor of the secret diplomatic contact but they had to use the good offices of the Pole and the Indian to go back and forth between Hanoi and Saigon because France didn't have a full fledge diplomatic mission in North VN at that time. To what extent progress have bêen made during those months culminating to de Gaulle's declaration in Aug 1963, nobody knows for certain. De Gaulle may have made that diplomatic sortie to give more impetus to a deadlock in the talks, for the situation was urgent in Saigon and the Diem regime nêeded some kind of political bơost. I wasn't aware of the VN press talking about de Gaulle proposition and the rumours of impending neutralization of South VN at that time. Usually I waited in the afternơon the Tu Do (frêedom) newspaper brought to my home by an old man in mobylette. And was always the first to read it, even before my dad got it on his desk. Now I realize that on that date, I was in a prison camp, being duly detained by Nhu's secret police during 10 days. I didn't have a clue about the political news in Saigon.

Did the Vietnamese get panicky to hearing all srts of rumors about the impending Laos-type neutralization and reunification of the 2 VNs? I think not. Saigonese were used to all kinds of rumors. They were immunized and just went on to their daily routine. But the air in the VN capital must have been thicker to breathe. Among the political class and intelligentsia, the accepted opinion was that the regime sêemed to be nearing its end and the talk of neutralism was another inopportune trick from Nhu to screw up things and make a messy situation even worse. Nhu for sure must have a different perspective. And we have to figure out the possible motives for him and the regime to espouse such a drastic turnabout face. What Diem  Nhu would have gained from a neutralist VN? Of course some political quarters dismissed his secret maneuverings as an empty threat and a blackmail tactic to increase the regime leverage against the US to extract some concessions. They believed that the Ngo brothers were tơo despised by the North in order to be accepted in a kind of political coexistence. They also suggested that the brothers wouldn't last long in any deal with the Communists for the same reason. such analysis of the situation sorely missed the depth of Nhu's calculations when he entered into the secret talks.

The existence of such high level talks between officials from both regimes was in itself an unprecedented event. And neither Nhu nor Hanoi have denied they were taking place. Also Nhu always thought that the Buđdhists opponents under the direction of leaders like the enigmatic and elusive Thich Tri Quang who till was hiding somewhere in the US embassy quarters wanted to make some kind of accommodation with the North, if he wasn't an outright Communist agent. Tri Quang in his convoluted way had expressed interest in a neutral South VN and thought that the Diem regime should be ousted for its uncompromising attitude towards the North. Buđdhism as a pacifist, non-violence preaching religion and the main religion of VN was never supporting one side against the other in the conflict. Its top hierarchy always sought out some sort of accommodation with the Communist North and they just prayed for the fighting to stop. With rumors of a possible rapprochement with Hanoi circulating, Nhu thought the news should be well received by his Buđdhist opponents. And he hoped that they would have no reason to kêep fighting against the regime. Now that South VN might become a neutral state, the Buđdhists will get what they wanted. Anyway he tried to leak the news of his impending deal with Hanoi to steal the show from the pagodas and pull the rugs under his political adversaries.

Nhu calculated that his regime had nothing to fear from a power sharing arrangement with the different factions including the Viet Cong. The Diem regime still has a strong army and special forces with some fiercely loyal commanders. Nhu has the secret police and the different political and paramilitary organizations he could rely on. And when push comes to shove, Diem is still capable using the same tactics that proved effective against the sects in the 1950's. And the regime is cautiously optimistic that the deal with Hanoi would materialize. In all of the discussions, the tone from Hanoi was business like and devoid of any recrimination or criticism. What have transpired from the talks showed no signs of acrimony or bad faith from either side. In the worst case scenario, the Americans could still step in to salvage the situation. The 2 brothers still thought that they represented the best for the US and kept the illusion that their ally won't drop them! Nhu considered his brother Diem as the front man, a kind of insurance policy to maintain some respectability to the regime. That might explain why he still stayed behind in his brother's shadow and not tơok over.

The leaders of North VN were very discreet about the talks and we have no idea who took part in them. If Diem and Nhu found some tangible reasons for talking, because their own stake depended on it, one could speculate about the other side strategy on that regard. What did they wish to accomplish from negotiating with the 'puppet' regime in Saigon? They already knew the regime in the South was in dire situation and on the brink of being dismissed by its ally creditor. They could just just have to wait out a few more months to pick up the big ripe fruit. Obviously North VN was also in a difficult condition, with bad drought and low harvest that year and with the mounting conflict between the 2 Marxist big brothers, the Soviets and the Chinese. Hanoi still had the vivid memory about the Geneva Accord and the unfinished business of general elections in the country. They didn't want to unduly prolong the conflict. And they also were afraid that any change of regime in the South would be less amenable to them with an increasing commitment by the Americans and a specter of a prolonged costly war to follow.

Ho Chi Minh never entertained the idea of fighting the US to be more dependent on the Soviets and even less, to fall into the hands of Chinese interests which were not always in line with his own. The tragedy of VN during that time was that it had 2 strong leaders who wanted to maintain VN independence but couldn't make peace between them, at the expense of untold sufferings for the people. Hanoi leaders were reportedly ready to accept a South VN as a separate entity and delay any intention to reunify the country for the time being. But they weren't eager to make peace yet at the expense of their sacrifice during the Indochina period. And they wanted the Americans out of VN first, as a prerequisite to any political deal. Their position hasn't changed much 9 years later.

One thing is clear with the Communists: they stick to their view and there's no need to second guess them. No doubt that Nhu made a more risky gambit in his dealings with Hanoi and his strategy was a complicate one. Ironically, Diem and Nhu have more to worry about the reaction of their own supporters, especially the military when they discussed about neutralism. For Nhu the bottom line was to keep on fighting and who knows, the changing political landscape might bring to the regime better days instead of being pushed around and bulldozed by the Americans.

Many unknowns still remained in Nhu's diplomatic equation, the most critical being the attitude of the US the big brother who was watching with suspicion and bewilderment his tricky moves. And Nhu underestimated the reaction of his generals towards the high stake involved. They felt  he had betrayed the country and the people who fought so hard to keep Communism at bay. Now they felt threatened by a possible sell out to the enemies of the North. The eventual coup plotters were reinforced in their conviction that Nhu had lost his mind and wanted to commit political suicide with his treacherous dealings with the enemy. They openly declared to the US that the coup they were about to mount against Diem was aimed at Nhu and his neutralist conspiracy. Nhu by trying to outsmart the US, his own military leaders and his political opponents had obviously overplayed his remaining cards.

Nhu just might make the fatal mistake of exaggerating the outcome of the Hanoi overture and by doing so precipitated the anti-neutralists to act against him. He did throw more smoke than necessary without creating a real design for a lasting peace. Nhu raised expectations for himself and fell into his own delusion that he could convince Ho Chi Minh. Maybe time was lacking before an agreement was reached. Or maybe it was a monumental bluff when he blind signed his opponents letting them believed that an accord was near. Judging from Hanoi attitude at the end, Nhu came out fairly disappointed during his last meetings with Hanoi officials, as some of his aides had noticed. Both parties were non committal at the end about a political solution. the only result was the determination of the Americans to get rid of him ad his brother Diem. But Nhu still made a last ditch effort to outwit the coup organizers on Nov 1,1963. The events of the last 2 months following de Gaulle initiative became one of the great tragedy of VN recent history.